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AbstrAct
Since Indonesian independence, its Chinese minority has been a victim of violent 
outbreaks, but also of restrictive policies arising from politics and administrative 
measures. From about 1957, with the closure of Chinese-language schools and 
subsequent regulations about expression of Chinese culture, many speak of 
the “erasure” of that culture through such restrictions. Violent anti-Chinese 
outbreaks have proceeded from the Indonesian Revolution and the presidency 
of Soekarno (especially the so-called “PP-10” measures against Chinese rural 
traders) to the era of Suharto, which began with the 1965-1967 anti-Communist 
massacres and their effects on ehtnic Chinese and came to an end with the 
provocation of violence against ethnic Chinese in major Indonesian cities. This 
paper also discusses the reactions to these waves of anti-Chinese measures: 
rejection, flight, but also countermeasures in the form of political activity. In 
the years since Reformasi, as attacks on them have subsided, many Chinese 
Indonesians have chosen to emphasize their participation in Indonesian history 
and their positive contributions to Indonesian culture. 
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IntroductIon1
In a striking installation from the year 2013, called ”Ranjang Hujan” (raining 
bed), Chinese-Indonesian artist FX Harsono displays a canopied Chinese 
Peranakan bed, perhaps a wedding bed, drenched by water falling from above. 
A text appears on a display behind the installation, saying in Indonesian, 
“Dalam tidur kuurai masa lalu, di ujung pena sejarah direka, di ujung senapan 
sejarah ditipu, di ujung pancuran sejarah tersapu” (In my sleep I entangled the 
past, at the tip of the pen history is predicted, at the tip of the gun history is 
deceived, at the end of the fountain, history washed away).2 For the artist, this 
“washing away” is the decades-long erasure of Chinese culture and Chinese 
heritage in Indonesia, especially between 1965 and 1998,  and the erasure of 
the memory of violent acts against the Chinese minority, beginning with those 
during the Indonesian Revolution.
FX Harsono is an insider who has shown his work in Indonesia and abroad. 
My viewpoint is that of an outsider, and the following is a brief account of 
what a historian may think about such erasures. It will address the reactions 
of the minority, as far as we can know them, that followed violent outbreaks 
or repression.
the IndonesIAn revolutIon, 1945-19493
During the Republican forces’ evacuation of Bandung in March 1946, and 
especially during the so-called First and Second Police Actions, that is the 
Dutch attacks on the Republic in July 1947 and December 1948, the Republican 
side repeatedly adopted a tactic of withdrawing before the better-armed British 
or Dutch attackers, evacuating the population, and executing scorched earth 
(bumi hangus) – preventing the much stronger enemy from profiting from 
its conquest.4 This meant destroying factories, sugar mills, and much more. 
Where possible, guerillas continued to attack Dutch lines from the countryside 
to which they had withdrawn. Evacuation and scorched earth meant burning 
Chinese property, forcing Chinese to move to other areas, even holding them 
in makeshift prisons. Some were killed outright and buried in shallow graves. 
In all, several thousand Chinese were killed in revolutionary violence, perhaps 
tens of thousands. Property losses were extensive. The violence and loss of life 
was worse in Sumatra than in Java, but comparatively little is known about 
anti-Chinese activities there.5
1 This is a revised version of a talk for the Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center, Leiden, 
Netherlands, “Publieksdag“, 24 June 2016 (see http://www.cihc.nl/uploads/images/
page_images/Publieksdag_2016_presentatie_Mary_Somers-Chinese_Minority_in_
Indonesia_1945-1998.pdf).
2 For a discussion of this installation and the intention of the artist, see Smith (2015).
3 For a more extended discussion of this period, see Heidhues (2012).
4 This was not a new idea. The Dutch themselves had carried out scorched earth when they 
retreated before the Japanese attack in 1942. Economically valuable installations, mines and 
their machinery for example, were systematically destroyed. Republican forces, however, often 
destroyed “softer” targets, such as homes or shops.
5 Violence against Chinese in Medan provoked the foundation of a Chinese security force 
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From the first days after the Japanese surrender and the Proclamation 
of Independence, Chinese were victims of plunder, robbery, and sometimes 
kidnapping, but gradually, with the restoration of order in the major cities, 
these ceased. After that, violence usually took place along the lines of combat.
Among the anti-Chinese attacks during the Revolution, that of Tangerang 
is the best known because it happened practically on the outskirts of Jakarta 
and the capital´s press reported extensively about it. Many Chinese had settled 
in rural areas around Old Batavia in early VOC times, and several thousand 
remained in the twentieth century. In May 1946, Dutch forces attacked and 
occupied the town of Tangerang, and Republican army forces withdrew from 
the town and its surrounding region. Irregular troops – laskar –  remained 
behind in rural areas, encouraging violence against Chinese villagers, burning 
their houses, murdering some, forcibly circumcising men and sometimes 
raping women. Of an estimated Chinese population of 25,000, over 1000 were 
dead, over 200 missing, and 15,300 refugees, overwhelmingly Chinese, fled 
to the city of Jakarta.6
What was the position of the Chinese and why were they targeted? To put 
it most simply, during the Revolution, most Chinese thought of themselves 
as neutrals and non-combatants, but neutrality was impossible. In addition, 
ethnic Chinese had the most to lose, their property was burned, and when 
they were evacuated from towns, they could not find refuge in villages, as did 
some others. Some Chinese favored the revolution and actively tried to help its 
cause,7 but some also became discouraged because of attacks on Chinese like 
those in Tangerang and ceased supporting the Republic. Some businessmen 
were active in helping the Republic acquire supplies and weapons from 
abroad, participating in a lively smuggling trade with Singapore.8 Most tried 
to survive. Thousands sought refuge in Dutch-controlled areas, leaving the 
impression that they sided with the Dutch. For security reasons, many did.
Documents in the libraries and archives witness the atrocities perpetrated 
on Chinese during the Revolution, and there is no need to catalog them here. 
The Chinese Associations in major cities on Java kept records and even lodged 
an official protest with the United Nations. Eyewitness depositions and grisly 
photographs of such atrocities can be found at the Cornell University Library, 
for example, deposited by a former Dutch journalist,9 but Dutch forces, too, 
were responsible for violence. 
there, see Van der Veer (2013). For a compelling account of the Revolution, and especially the 
hardships of evacuation of civilians, in Karo Batak areas of North Sumatra, see Steedly (2013). 
The evacuees she describes were village people, not ethnic Chinese, and they seem to have 
acquiesced in evacuation because they felt it supported the Revolution.
6 Heidhues (2012: 386-387), citing reports compiled by Chinese community organizations.
7 Among them were Siauw Giok Tjhan and the later Admiral John Lie.
8 Twang Peck Yang (1998: 266 ff).
9 See “Guide to the Niels A. Douwes Dekker Papers”, Collection Number: 3480, Division of 
Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, (http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/
EAD/htmldocs/RMM03480.html).
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My impression from reading documents from this period in the colonial 
archives - and I cannot prove it - is that the returning Dutch authorities were 
eager to record atrocities against Chinese because they hoped to keep the 
Chinese minority from supporting the Republic, while they seldom kept 
records of losses among ethnic Indonesians. Yet Indonesian military and 
civilian losses, from violence, forced evacuation, hunger, and preventable 
disease, went into the tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands. An estimated 
8000 to 12,000 Indonesians perished in just three weeks in the November 1945 
battle of Surabaya alone, and probably others died when they left Surabaya 
to take refuge in the countryside. Also in the first weeks of the Revolution, a 
“brief genocide”, as Robert Cribb calls it, brought the death of a comparatively 
large proportion of Eurasians.10
responses to vIolence  
Protests directed to the Indonesian and Dutch authorities were to no avail. The 
ethnic Chinese had to respond in other ways, above all, by movement from the 
countryside to cities for safety and from contested areas to those controlled by 
the Dutch. Emigration abroad was limited by the difficulty of finding a safe 
and open destination – a few students left for China or the Netherlands, but 
conditions in China were not conducive to taking on immigrants and countries 
like the USA or Australia were still closed to immigration of Chinese. 
Second, many thousands rejected Indonesian citizenship. Between 
December 1949 and December 1951, Chinese born in Indonesia who had 
been Netherlands subjects (about 60% of all Chinese) could automatically 
become Indonesian citizens or, if they chose, could actively reject Indonesian 
citizenship and become Chinese citizens. The Indonesian government thought 
that about ten percent might declare for Chinese citizenship, but when the tally 
was finally made in 1953, up to 40% of those eligible, between 600,000 and 
700,000 persons, had officially rejected Indonesian citizenship. When added 
to the foreign-born (and their children), who were already Chinese citizens, 
this meant that over half of Chinese in Indonesia were aliens, a surprisingly 
high number for a young country to absorb.11 (In Chinese law, all persons 
of Chinese descent in Indonesia were still Chinese citizens, something that 
ended only with implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty after 1959, as 
described below.) A small number of Chinese also opted to be Dutch citizens. 
Among the reasons for rejecting being “Indonesian”, although not the only 
one, was the experience of anti-Chinese violence.
A third reaction was silence. Although the Tangerang incident was well-
publicized because of its closeness to Jakarta, a veil of silence covered most 
other incidents for years. Journalist Kwee Thiam Tjing wrote a graphic memoir 
of anti-Chinese violence in Malang, Indonesia dalam api dan bara, published in 
1947, which soon vanished from bookshops. It was only republished in 2004.12
10 Cribb 2008. 
11 Mozingo (1976: 97), citing an official of the Indonesian Department of Justice.
12 Tjamboek Berdoeri 2004. 
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Some twenty years ago, Claudine Salmon described how the inscription 
in a cemetery in Bagor, near Nganjuk (Picture 1), avoided a direct description 
of Revolutionary violence against Chinese.
This impressive memorial in East Java, not far from Madiun, commemorates 
some 800 persons killed near there in December 1948. When Dutch forces 
approached the town during the Second Police Action, the Republican military 
commander gathered all the male Chinese in the town into a warehouse and set 
fire to it. Anyone who tried to flee was shot. Siauw Giok Tjhan in his memoirs 
describes this “cruel” and “ruthless” massacre that left Nganjuk a “city of 
widows”. The memorial was erected in 1951-1952, but it does not explain 
how these people died. Salmon in her collection of Chinese epigraphy in Java 
translates the central inscriptions as “Collective Tomb of Our Compatriots 
Who Met with Difficulty (or Who Were Victims)“ and “The remains of 790 
compatriots who were victims on the occasion of the Second Dutch Military 
Action that took place in 1948 are buried here”.13 Only in 1981 was Siauw´s 
account published, blaming the Republican forces.14
Fourth, the name Siauw Giok Tjhan of course also stands for a different 
response - joining Indonesian politics. After Chinese Indonesians made some 
false starts in founding political groupings to represent their interests, in 
March 1954 Siauw joined with other Chinese Indonesians to found Baperki 
(Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia). Baperki called itself 
13 Salmon and Siu (1997: 740-741).
14 Siauw Giok Tjhan (1981: 142-143).
Picture 1. Nganjuk memorial (photograph by FX Harsono, 2012).
98 99Wacana Vol. 18 No. 1 (2017) Mary Somers Heidhues, Violent, political, and administrative repression 
the Consultative Body (technically it was not a political party) for Indonesian 
citizenship. Citizen (WNI, Warga Negara Indonesia), however, usually simply 
meant “Chinese”, even when Baperki denied that it was an organization 
specifically for Chinese. 
the soeKArno erA, 1950-1965
Some people believe that Chinese Indonesians were protected under President 
Soekarno, but this is not necessarily true. In reality, political and administrative 
measures constantly attacked their interests or limited their freedoms. In 
the 1950s leading political parties attempted to dismantle what nationalists 
called the “colonial economy” by limiting Chinese businesses and promoting 
indigenous entrepreneurs. Citizenship also remained a problem. Even the 
expression “Chinese problem (later: masalah Tionghoa/Cina)” dates at least 
from the 1950s.15 
After 1957, the President shared power with the military and the 
Communist Party. When regional rebellions against Jakarta broke out, martial 
law put entire regions under military authority, which again had consequences 
for the Chinese minority. In 1959, the Minister of Trade determined to forbid 
aliens (meaning “Chinese”) from engaging in retail trade outside of about 
140 major cities,16 something that would limit or abolish their role in rural 
crop-buying and lending. Some local military commanders then expanded 
the regulation to require all aliens in their provinces to leave these areas, a 
regulation that was brutally implemented in West Java, forcing many families 
to flee to Jakarta or other cities. 
Another anti-Chinese measure that originated with some regional military 
commanders was the closing of all Chinese-language schools to Indonesian 
citizens at the end of 1957. This reduced the number of Chinese-language 
schools from 1800 to about 500. This measure also closed a few Dutch 
schools, but, again, it was really about Chinese. In this case, the primary 
reaction to these measures was flight – an exodus of some 120,000 persons, 
mostly to China. China actually sent ships to pick up the emigrants, many of 
whom had previously desired to leave Indonesia, but could not pay for the 
trip. About one-third of these emigrants were young people, mostly from 
Chinese-language schools, hoping to continue their studies in China. Anny 
Tan of Retour Amoy17 and her family were among those who departed for 
China, although she and her husband came from Peranakan families and 
their children had attended Dutch, not Chinese, schools. Probably several 
thousand left for Taiwan, Europe, and North America during this crisis, but 
the numbers are not known.
For those who did not flee, an important reaction to the turmoil was the 
15 Muaja (1958?). This date of publication is not given.
16 This final decree was known as PP-10, Peraturan Presiden 10/1959 (Presidential Regulation 
Number 10 of 1959). See Somers (1965: 194-223). For the discussion of closing Chinese schools 
and implementing the Dual Citizenship Treaty, see also that source and Mozingo 1976.
17 Blussé 2000. 
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implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty with China in 1959-1961. This 
allowed persons with both Indonesian and Chinese citizenship to choose 
which one they wanted to keep. Supposedly this “act of choosing” ended the 
uncertainty of the citizenship status of Chinese Indonesians – but it applied 
only to those who were Indonesian citizens. Even though a great majority of 
those eligible chose Indonesian citizenship over citizenship of China, most 
Chinese in Indonesia could not choose and continued to be aliens. 
Finally, in 1963, a minor traffic dispute set off anti-Chinese violence in 
Bandung and several neighboring cities. The deeper cause may have been 
a protest against Soekarno´s politics and his friendship with China. Again, 
violence led to emigration. A striking example is Yap Tjwan Bing, who had 
helped design Indonesian independence in 1945 and who was a loyal adherent 
of the Nationalist Party. Yap, who lived in Bandung, saw his property sacked 
and his family physically threated. To protect and support his disabled son, he 
reluctantly decided to leave temporarily for California, but his exile became 
permanent.18
1965-1998: vIolence And erAsure 
The 50th anniversary of the September 30, 1965 incident has recalled the 
mass murders following General Suharto´s takeover of power. Anti-Chinese 
violence and anti-Chinese propaganda, as well as heritage erasure followed. It 
must be emphasized however that most victims of the violence of 1965-1967 
were Javanese and Balinese who were associated with the PKI (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) – 500,000 or many more were killed, 
while several times that number were arrested, exiled, and deprived of their 
civil rights. Among the victims were Chinese, but in general they were not 
the primary target. However, because the People´s Republic of China was 
blamed for inciting the PKI  to rebel, everything Chinese became suspect and 
many Chinese Indonesians lived in fear. 
The military did carry out forced expulsions of Chinese from Aceh, West 
Kalimantan, and parts of East Java, causing some thousands of deaths. All of 
this was supposedly to enforce the old bans on alien trade and residence in 
rural areas.19 A recent study has called the Aceh expulsions a “genocide” of 
the Chinese.20 I have not had access to the full study and will reserve judgment 
here.
In the following years of Suharto´s rule, heritage erasure, something 
the Ranjang Hujan symbolically depicts, meant that all Chinese-language 
schools were closed, as were nearly all Chinese-language newspapers, even 
the Chinese temples were Indonesianized, being forced to emphasize their 
Buddhist tradition and even call themselves “vihara”. Import of Chinese-
language texts was equally forbidden.21
18  Yap Tjwan Bing 1988. 
19  The best, and most reliable, source on these measures is Coppel 1983.
20  Melvin 2013, 2015. 
21  The measures had limited success: clandestine instruction in Chinese continued and some 
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Again, people left. Chinese Indonesians departed because of physical or 
psychological threats, bureaucratic harassment and reduced opportunity for 
educating their children. From the late 1950s, admission of Chinese Indonesians 
to public universities, especially to popular faculties like medicine and law, 
was limited. Private universities were expensive and/or not accredited. 
After 1965, the turmoil was frightening. The economic situation had gone 
rapidly downhill for years. From 1966, all Chinese were called not the polite 
“Tionghoa” but the offensive “Cina”. Ang Jan Goan, long-time publisher of 
the newspaper Sin Po, who had consciously chosen Indonesian citizenship 
in 1960, speaks in his memoirs of “tahun-tahun yang mengerikan” (horrifying 
years). When in 1968 friends told him of the (false) rumor that he had been 
arrested, he and his wife decided to join their son in Canada.22
Another example is a graduate of a Chinese-language school (before they 
were closed) who could not enter a public university, studying instead at a 
private institution. Although he avidly supported the students´ protests that 
led to the fall of Suharto, he still remembers a truckful of young demonstrators 
that passed him on the street in Jakarta, yelling “Cina pulang” and spitting at 
him. He too left for Canada, joining an uncle there and continuing his studies.23
During the 1960s, Western countries began to open immigration to 
Chinese. The US and Canada actively recruited doctors until 1968 by admitting 
people who passed a special test that gave them a right to immigrate. A look 
at some autobiographies of Chinese-Indonesian doctors who left for North 
America during the 1960s confirms the motivations listed above. These men 
left to get ahead professionally, because they were not admitted to specialty 
training (even though many had served the government for years in remote 
areas), they sought a better future for their children, and, additionally, they 
experienced fear of violence and disorder.24
Still, the Suharto era was not only negative for the Chinese minority. In the 
1980s, nearly all Chinese in Indonesia became citizens, ending – theoretically 
– the question of their legal status. Political stability, despite repression, and 
economic growth lifted general welfare. At least one person I spoke with 
during those years insisted, “as long as the economy is good, Indonesians 
will be satisfied and we (Chinese) will have nothing to fear”. Some Chinese 
businessmen profited from the new economy – the cukong – by forming close 
ties to political-military power holders. Restrictions persisted, however. For 
example, most Chinese Indonesians had to replace their Chinese names with 
Indonesian-sounding ones, but their identity papers still contained a mark 
indicating that they were of Chinese origin.25
Chinese texts circulated from hand to hand. Similarly, even the famous Tjap Go Meh processions 
after Chinese New Year , which were not to take place in public, returned in a few places.
22 Ang Jan Goan (2009: 368).
23 Wu Da Ying 2013. 
24 Oei Tjien 2009.
25 For an overview of the situation in the Suharto years, see Heidhues 2006.
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suhArto’s rule ends In vIolence
The run up to the end of President Suharto´s New Order government may 
have started when riots broke out in Medan in 1994. There, workers staged a 
protest against poor working conditions, but the demonstrations ended with 
plundering and destruction of Chinese property. Anti-Chinese outbreaks 
followed in several places in Java, Makassar, Banjarmasin, and again in 
Medan in the years 1996-1999. Often the spark that lit the explosions had 
little or nothing to do with Chinese Indonesians, but ended in torching of 
supermarkets, shops, cars, and houses that belonged to them. Some of the 
trouble came from conservative Islamic elements reacting against their own 
lack of power and privilege in Indonesian society.
Unquestionably, especially after the Asian monetary crisis of 1997, 
the government contributed to anti-Chinese sentiment by harping on the 
“kesenjangan” (gap) between rich (meaning “Chinese” without distinction 
between wealthy and not) and poor (meaning “native”– ironically some of 
whom,, especially Suharto´s own family, were themselves profiteers). When 
violence broke out, those in authority often excused the outbreaks by referring 
to the wealth gap and blaming Chinese for the monetary crisis. In some cases, 
scores of young men on motorcycles provoked violence and arson. Those who 
might have suppressed the violence and protected the innocent stood aside.26 
In May 1998, after four students were shot in Jakarta during non-violent 
protests against Suharto´s rule, there, in Solo, and elsewhere, vicious, 
coordinated attacks on Chinese property and persons, including rape and 
sexual humiliation of Chinese women, followed. Perpetrators included 
truckloads of young, athletic, black-booted men, typical of the paramilitary 
organizations controlled and manipulated by certain army leaders. They 
encouraged city people to enter and loot shops and malls, then set fire to the 
buildings. Of over 1000 dead, most were actually looters, not Chinese, but 
this does not change the fact that atrocities and violence were directed first 
at Chinese Indonesians. 
Many of them, as well as many foreigners – some estimate the total 
number to be as much as 150,000 – fled Java for safety in Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, or Australia, or even Bali or West Kalimantan. Probably, most 
refugees returned to their homes when the political situation became quiet. 
Vice-President Habibie, who succeeded Suharto, left the task of investigating 
the outbreaks to official and NGO-initiatives, who produced a lengthy report, 
but few if any perpetrators were called to account. 
Relief came with the subsequent presidencies of Gus Dur and Megawati, 
who rolled back most anti-Chinese administrative measures, opening the door 
wide for Chinese culture and Chinese festivities, removing stigmatization of 
ethnic Chinese, and probably improving the general atmosphere. Bureaucratic 
harassment has since been reduced, if not eliminated. Serious interethnic 
violence, often along religious lines, plagued these presidencies, but most 
was not directed to Chinese as such.
26 This and the following description is based largely on Purdey 2006.
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vIolence In perspectIve
Perhaps it is not correct to discuss violence against ethnic Chinese in isolation. 
Violence punctuates Indonesian history.27 As mentioned, the Revolution was 
violent and the total number of casualties is unknown. Many of the following 
years were marked by violence, not only that against the Chinese minority 
– Darul Islam and regional rebellions come to mind, and more recently the 
situation in Aceh and Papua. Elements of the military and certain Islamic 
groups have been repositories of violence, as have, as John Sidel28 notes, the 
kampung people, who may be quick to join when trouble breaks out. For this 
reason, a potential for anti-Chinese violence remains, and some regions are 
more susceptible to outbreaks than others. Violence often occurs at times 
of political transition, when competition for power breaks out in uncertain 
circumstances, as in the major cases listed above. There is reason for cautious 
optimism.
Responses from Chinese Indonesians to the changes since 1998 have 
included modest participation in political life (Jakarta, West Kalimantan), 
although entry into political competition can also provoke resentment. Chinese 
Indonesians may now emphasize their rootedness in Indonesia, particularly 
as Peranakans. They are a suku, and thus pribumi, and their efforts, individual 
and collective, have contributed to building modern Indonesia.29 In 2006, 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhojono helped dedicate a new 
site at the tourist attraction Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the Taman Budaya 
Tionghoa (Garden of Chinese Culture). Some of the discussion surrounding 
this exhibit involved the question of what is meant by “Chinese” and 
“Chinese culture”. Is the new openness an opportunity to recall the culture 
of the Chinese mainland in language and architecture or should it emphasize 
how Chinese culture has been expressed within Indonesia, for example, in 
Chinese-Malay literature, Peranakan clothing styles, or in the contributions 
of individuals to public life?30 
A positive result of the discussion since 2014 is the opening of the Hakka 
Museum on the Taman Mini site. In that museum, the Wall of Prominent 
Chinese Indonesians (including many non-Hakkas) displays the moving 
inscription “Indonesia, we are loyal/devoted to you!” 
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